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AGENCY-FRAu---LIABILITY OF AGENT.-The defendant, as agent for the land
company, obtained from the plaintiff by fraud a contract of sale for certain
lands. The plaintiff made payments to the defendant, who turned them over
to the land company. Having discovered the fraud, subsequent to the payment
over, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for all the money paid.
Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Peterson v. McManus (1919, Iowa) 172
N. W. 46o.
It seems well settled that an agent is liable for all money obtained through
a contract which is repudiated for fraud, if he has not paid it over. Kleine
Bros. v. Gidcomb (913, Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 462. And the principal
case follows the weight of authority in holding that payment of the money to
the principal does not affect the agent's liability. The courts treat the case
as if there was no agency and regard payment to the principal as in no way
different from any other disposition of the money fraudulently obtained.
Townson v. Wilson (i8o8, C. P.) I Camp. 396; Seidel v. Peckworth (1823, Pa.)
io Serg. & R. 442; Messer-Moore Ins. & Real Estate Co. v. Trotwood Land Co.
(1II) 17o Ala. 473, 54 So. 228. It is sometimes said, however, that where the
purchaser delivers the money to the agent with the understanding that it is
to be turned over to the principal immediately, he should recover only from
the latter. See Butler v. Livermore (i868, N. Y.) 52 Barb. 570, 579. But
the only ground for such a doctrine is an inference that the purchaser has
-consented that the agent should not be liable. The inference can only be
drawn from the consent to the payment over, which consent was obtained by
the fraud of the agent. There is likewise a tendency to limit the liability of
the agent unless notice is given not to pay over. Cf. Hardy v. American
Express Co. (19o2) 182 Mass. 328, 65 N. E. 375. This seems to rest on the
curious premise that the defrauder should be protected until informed of his
fraud. The degree of the liability has appeared unjust to some judges, who
have maintained that recovery of the entire sum paid should be had from the
agent only after it is impossible to reach the principal. Cf. Besiry v. Monahan
(19o8) 137 Iowa, 650, 112 N. W. 11o2. There is little precedent to support
this and no need for such a holding. The result would be to place on the
defrauded party the burden of proving the inaccessibility of the principal. In
most cases, if the principal were within reach, suit would be brought against
him anyhow, since the money handed over would probably be in his possession.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LIEN OF ATTORNEY-SETTLEMENT BY PARTiES.-The
plaintiff sued for the conversion of an automobile, asking large damages.
The answer showed counter-claims for $2,ooo on notes of the plaintiff and other
items. After having pleaded, the plaintiff settled out of court without his
attorney's knowledge and obtained a discharge of the counter-claims, together
with $47o in cash. The attorney, having contracted for forty-five per cent.
of whatever amount might be recovered, obtained an order to have the settle-
ment set aside and his share determined. The lower court gave him judgment
for $1,12o. Held, that the attorney's statutory lien on the cause of action
after summons attaches only to the clear balance recovered after all cross-
demands and equities are set off, even if these latter have nothing to do with
the cause of action, and that the judgment should be modified to $225. Wildung
v. Security Mortgage Co. (igig, Minn.) 173 N. W. 429.
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It has long been recognized that an attorney has a lien on all papers or
moneys of his client in his possession for his just compensation. He also
has been given a specific lien on judgments recovered by him for his clients.
In England this lien was only on the costs awarded by the court, and some
states in this country followed that rule. Mitchell v. Oldfield (1791, K. B.)
4 T. R. 123; Currier v. Boston & Me. R. R. Co. (1858) 37 N. H. =3. Generally,
however, his lien attaches for the amount of compensation for which he con-
tricted. A judgment debtor is entitled in equity or by statute to have any
claims he may hold against the judgment creditor set off against the judgment.
Ex parte Rhodes (i8og, Eng. Ch.), 15 Ves. 539; Hurst v. Sheets (1866) 21
Iowa, 5O1. The question raised by the principal case is whether or not the
lien of the attorney on the judgment or cause of action is superior to the right
of the judgment debtor to set off his claims. It seems settled that when these
claims arise in the same suit, as a defense for instance, the lien attaches only
to the clear balance struck between the parties. Ex parte Rhodes, supra;
Popplewell v. Hill (1892) 55 Ark. 622, 18 S. W. 1O54. When, however, the cross-
demand arises entirely outside the cause of action, the question has had far
from uniform answers. See McDonald v. Napier (1853) 14 Ga. 89, io8. It
appears that the growing majority of states as well as the English rule favor
the attorney's lien, contrary to the view expressed by the decision in the prin-
cipal case. It might be distinguished, however, because it involves a settlement
before judgment, and the equity of the attorney's claim is not so clear. A
rather unique solution has been found that the claim should have precedence,
as between the attorney and the judgment debtor, which was first actively
enforced by notice given to the other party. Hroch v. Aultnan (1893) 3 S. D.
477, 54 N. W. 269.
BANKRUPTcY-PREFERENCES-DATE AS TO WHICH PREFERENTIAL CHARACTER OF
TRANSFER IS DETERmiNED.-The defendant received a partial payment, less than
fifty per cent., of his claim against an insolvent debtor, within four months of
the latter's bankruptcy. At the time of payment the bankrupt had assets exceed-
ing fifty per cent. of his liabilities. In a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy to
recover the payment as a preference, the court charged that "the test of a
preference is the payment of a larger percentage of the creditor's claim than
others of the same class receive." Held, that the charge was incorrect, since
the preferential character of a payment depends upon its effect at the time
when made and not upon what other creditors will receive on final settlement
of the estate in bankruptcy. Slayton v. Drown (igi, Vt.) lO7 AtI. 307.
This case raises an interesting question in the interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Act upon which there is surprisingly little authority. Sec. 6oa defines
preferences and declares that a transfer by an insolvent debtor is a preference
if, inter alia, "the effect of the enforcement of such . . . transfer will be
to enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt
than any other of such creditors of the same class." U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916,
sec. 9644. Shall the effect of the transfer in giving the transferee an advantage
over other creditors of the same class be tested by the creditor's ability to
pay a similar percentage to such other creditors (I) at the date of the transfer,
or (2) at the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or (3) by the
dividends ultimately received by the other creditors from the trustee in bank-
ruptcy? The principal case adopts the first alternative. Dicta may be found
which support it. Brittain Dry-goods Co v. Bertenshaw (1904) 68 Kans. 734,
75 Pac. io27; Herzberg v. Riddle (1911) 171 Ala. 368, 37, 54 So. 635, 63. The
argument is based chiefly upon the language of Sec. 6ob which defines voidable
preferences and declares that if the insolvent debtor make a transfer within
112
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four months of the bankruptcy petition and "the . . transfer then operate
as a preference, and the person receiving it . . . shall then have reasonable.
cause to believe that the transfer would effect a preference, it shall be voidable
by the trustee." Despite the plausible argument that the use of the word
"then" indicates" that the preferential character of the transfer is to be tested
by its effect when made and that the creditor's'belief must be predicated upon
the then existing state of affairs, it is believed that the sounder view adopts
the second alternative above mentioned, the date of the filing of the petition.
This view is persuasively presented in Rubenstein v. Lottow (1916) 223 Mass.
227, 111 N. E. 973. It harmonizes with the general policy of determining all
bankruptcy questions in so far as possible with reference to conditions as they
exist when the petition is filed. Cf. Everett v. Judson (1913) 228 U. S. 474,
477, 33 Sup. Ct. 568, 570. It has the practical advantage of testing all prefer-
ences by the conditions existing at a given time, instead of requiring the court
in the case of successive preferences to investigate the precise ratio of the
bankrupt's debts and liabilities at numerous dates within the four months'
period. It is consistent with the language of the Act for by treating "prefer-
ence" in 6ob as denoting only such transactions as are defined as preferences
in sec. 6oa it is possible to construe sec. 6ob as making voidable only such
transfers as operate when made to produce a situation which at the time of
bankruptcy will give the transferee an advantage over other creditors. It is
quite possible for a creditor to have reasonable cause to believe that the result
of the transfer may be an ultimate preference when bankruptcy comes, although
not one at the moment.
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw-ExERcIsE OF WAR PowER-PRoHIBITIox Act.-The
complainants, owners of vineyards in California, who used their crops for the
manufacture of wines, sued for an injunction, pendente lite, against the United
States District Attorney and a Collector of Internal Revenue for district of
New York, to prevent seizures and prosecutions under the Act of Congress
of November 21, 1918, commonly known as the War-Time Prohibition Act.
This complaint was based on the ground that the enforcement of the act was
unconstitutional inasmuch as the emergency justifying an exercise of war
powers was over. Held, that the injunction should not be granted. Scatena,
Lawson & Perelli v. Caffey and Edward (igig, S. D. N. Y.) N. Y. L. J. 1555.
The Act of November 21, i98, was passed as a war measure and has been
held a valid exercise of the war power. Jacob Hoffman Brewing Co. v.
MfcEllicott and Caffey (June 26, 1919) C. C. A. 2d, October Term, 1918. Since
the war power is vested in Congress and the Executive Department for the
duration of the war, before holding an exercise thereof invalid, the courts
would have to hold that the war is over. But the ends of wars have in the past
been determined by the Political Department of the Government. Conley v.
Calhoun County Supervisors (i868) 2 W. Va. 416. The civil war was termi-
nated in the different states by a series of Presidential Proclamations. United
States v. Anderson (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. 56; The Protector (1871, U. S.)
12 Wall. ioo. The Spanish-American war, a foreign war, was ended by the
signing of the treaty of peace, the protocol, similar to the armistice of igi8,
having no operative legal effect. Nephews v,. U. S. (19o8) 43 Ct. Cl. 430;
WcLeod v. United States (19io) 45 Ct. Cl. 339. In either case the courts take
judicial notice of the acts of the other departments. No cases have been found
where courts have admitted evidence to dispute the facts they are bound to
know. The attitude of the judicial department has been that it was a question
for the other departments to determine, and the inference is strong that no
S
YALE LAW JOURNAL
evidence would be admitted. See Philips v. Hatch (1871, C. C. D. Iowa) I Dill.
571; In re Wuizen (1916, S. D. Oh. E. D.) 235 Fed. 362, 365. If no evidence
is admitted, the knowledge of the courts is limited to what they judicially
notice. One court found in the President's speech to Congress of November
ii, 1918, in which he declared, that "The war thus comes to an end," an
official declaration which could be noticed. United States v. Hicks (1919,
W. D. Ky.) 256 Fed. 707. But nowhere else has it been given such significance.
The conclusion seems warranted that, until the other departments act, the
judiciary must continue to recognize the existence of a state of war, and to
consider an exercise of the war power as valid. If this be true, the other
departments can alone terminate the period within which these special powers
are theirs.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TREATiEs-EFFECT ON STATE LAws.-A treaty between
the United States and Great Britain provided that the citizens of each of
the contracting nations might dispose of their personal property within the
jurisdiction of the other and that the heirs or legatees, who are either resident
or non-resident citizens of the contracting nations, should succeed to personal
property and pay the same duties as the citizens of the country where the
property is located would have to pay in similar cases. A state statute imposed
upon non-resident aliens a larger tax than that levied upon the state citizens
and resident aliens. Held, that as against citizens of Great Britain, the tax
in excess of that imposed upon the citizens of the state was invalid. Trott v.
State (1gig, N. D.) 171 N. W. 827.
The effect of treaties on existing state laws was a question presented to the
Supreme Court soon after the formation of the Union. Ware v. Hylton (1796,
U. S.) 3 Dall. 199. It has ever since been held that a treaty supersedes and
nullifies all conflicting provisions in the constitution and laws of any state,
and that whenever there is such a conflict, it is the duty of the judges of
each state to uphold and enforce the treaty provisions. See Whitney v.
Robertson (1888) 124 U. S. 19o, 8 Sup. Ct. 456; Chryssikos v. Demarco
(1919, Md.) 1O7 At. 358. However, in spite of the seeming uniformity of
decisions on this point, cases are continually arising in which the effect of a
treaty is contested. See It re Moynihan (915) 172 Iowa, 571, 151 N. W. 504
(treaty with England); Brown v. Peterson (1919, Iowa) 107 N. W. 444
(treaty with Sweden). The decision in the principal case is obviously sound.
CONTRACTs-ACCORD---SPEcFIC PERFORMANcE.-The plaintiff was indebted to
the defendant, who brought suit at law. That case was pending at the time of
the instant action. Then they compromised, in writing and under seal, whereby
the plaintiff promised that he would pay to the defendant a certain sum on a
specific date, and certain monthly installments for the support of the defendant
for life; and the defendant promised that, upon receipt of this said sum, she
would reassign to the plaintiff certain life insurance policies, indorse to him a
check payable to their joint order, and return a will and certain books and
documents. The plaintiff duly tendered and demanded performance by the
defendant who refused to perform. The plaintiff, who averred continued
readiness to perform, then brought this bill in equity for specific performance.
Held, that this compromise was an accord only, and could not form the basis
of an action. Laughlin, J. dissenting. Moers v. Moers (igig, App. Div.) 176
N. Y. Supp. 277.
The court followed the ancient common-law doctrine that on an accord no
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remedy lies. Lynn v. Bruce (1794, C. P.) 2 H. Bl. 317; Allen v. Harris
(1537, C. P.) i Ld. Raym, 122. This doctrine developed when bilateral contracts
were not recognized by the early common law; and an accord is generally, if
not always, a bilateral contract. But now, since bilateral contracts are enforce-
able everywhere, there is no reason for the continuance of this. And accords
are now enforceable contracts in most jurisdictions. Nash v. Armstrong (1861,
C. P.) io C. B. N. S. 259; Schweider v. Lang (1882) 29 Minn. 254, 13 N. W.
33; Hunt v. Brown (1888) 146 Mass. 253, 15 N. E. 587. In the principal case,
the accord is a good bilateral contract, and, since tender was properly made,
the court erred in saying that the defendant was never under a duty because an
actual payment was never made. The defendant can not defeat the plaintiff's
right by refusal of tender. Actual payment by the plaintiff was waived by the
defendant's refusal to accept tender. See Stafford v. Pooler (1867, N. Y.) 67
Barb. 143. The general rule is that an executory accord does not bar an action
at law; and that tender of performance of the accord likewise is no bar.
Ryan vz. Ward (1872) 48 N. Y. 204; Kromer v. Heins (1879) 75 N. Y. 574.
If, however, the remedy at law is inadequate and the doctrine of mutuality of
performance is not involved, an executory accord which fulfills contract require-
ments will be enforced in equity, if tender has been made. Chicora Fer. Co. v.
Duncan (19oo) 91 Md. 144, 46 Atl. 347; Very v. Levy (1851, U. S.) 13 How.
345. The plaintiff could then plead his release in bar to the pending action
at law. The ,tendency of courts to-day seems to be to enforce compromises
of disputed claims whenever possible on grounds of public policy; and it is
submitted that few modern courts would follow this case. See Corbin, Discharge
of Contracts (1913) 22 YALE LAW JOmNAL, 529, 530.
CoNTRACrs-Accoan-ToRT CLAims-ATTAcHMEN.-A state statute provided
that a creditor, by a bill in equity, could attach a chose in action which belonged
to the debtor and was by its nature assignable. The defendant had a tort claim
for personal injuries against A and entered into an agreement with him to
accept $85o in full satisfaction of his claim. The plaintiff brought a bill in
equity against the defendant and secured a judgment in satisfaction of which
he attempted to reach the claim of the defendant to the $85o. Held, that this
claim could not be reached. White Sewing Machine Co. v. Morrison (1919,
Mass.) 122, N. E. 291.
A tort claim for personal injuries before judgment has been entered is not
assignable nor can it be reached, under the above statute, by a creditor's bill.
Bennett v. Sweet (1898) 171 Mass. 600, 51 N. E. 183; Wilde v. fahoney
(i9o3) 183 Mass. 455, 67 N. E. 337. The agreement with A, an accord. execu-
tory, is an enforceable bilateral contract. Schweider v. Lang (1882) 29 Minn.
254, 13 N. W. 33. But the contract of accord alone is no defence to an action
on the tort claim. Kromer v. Hein (1879) 75 N. Y. 574; Field v. Aldrich
(1895) 162 Mass. 587, 39 N. E. 288. Hence the defendant secured a contract
right to the $850, conditional on his tendering a release from liability on the
tort claim to A. He could sue either on the contract of accord, or on the tort
claim, subject to damages for breach of contract, in case of the latter, if A
made proper tender. However, a creditor does not have the power of choosing
which of two remedies the debtor shall elect. Lewis v. Dubose (1856) 29 Ala.
219; Johnson v. Laiping (1867) 34 Calif. 293. So it would seem that the
instant case was correctly decided.
CoNTRAcrs-CoNsIDERTIoN-CANcELLATIoN ox NoTIcE.-The defendant dealer
made a contract with the plaintiff manufacturer by which the former was given
the exclusive privilege of sale of the latter's products within a certain terri-
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tory. There was a provision that the dealer could not recover for loss ofprofits resulting from the failure of the manufacturer to deliver goods ordered.
and another provision allowed cancellation of the contract by either party
upon sixty days' notice, or immediately upon any violation of the agreement.
The plaintiff brought suit on a note given by the defendant in part payment
for goods delivered, and the defendant brought a cross-complaint for loss ofpr6fits which he alleged had been sustained as a result of nondelivery by theplaintiff. Held, ,that the cross-complaint was not enforceable because of theprovision that the dealer could not recover for loss of profits due to thefailure of the manufacturer to fill orders. Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.(r9i9, Ark.) 212 S. W. 313.
In a concurring opinion, McCulloch, C. J., held that there was a valid con-
tract, since the dealer gained the exclusive privilege, for a given period oftime, to sell the manufacturer's products within certain territory, and assumed
the duties to sell no other products in competition, and to purchase as many as
twenty-five automobiles, at a stated price. The right acquired by the defendant,
that the plaintiff should not sell to anyone else in the territory assigned, was
of value and a direct limitation on the privileges of the plaintiff. Hence there
was sufficient consideration for the undertakings of the defendant. For even
a small limitation on the rights, privileges, powers, or immunities of one party
is held to be sufficient consideration for -the other's promise. Scriba v. Neely(r9o8) 130 Mo. App. 258, to9 S. W. 845; Russell v. Henry C. Patterson Co.(ri12) 48 Pa. Super. Ct. 571; Harp v. Hamilton (915, Tex.) 177 S. W. 565.A contract for future delivery of personal property, which confers upon either
party the arbitrary power of cancellation prior to the delivery, would not be
enforceable. Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co. (1912, C. C. A.7th) I94 Fed. 324; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co. (1912,
C. C. A. 7th) 2oi Fed. 499. But in the principal case, sixty days' notice was
required for cancellation and this would seem to be sufficient to exempt the
contract from the rule applied in the above-mentioned cases. It is true thatimmediate cancellation could be made for any violation of the agreement, but
this power could become vested in either party. A contract which reserved to
the defendant the privilege to cancel upon fifteen days' notice was held not tobe void. Thomas v. Anthony (1916) 30 Calif. App. 217, 157 Pac. 823. In theinstant case, it seems that the fact that the dealer was given exclusive selling
privileges in his territory would 'be ample consideration for his undertakings,
and that, therefore, the contract would be enforceable. Hence, the concurring
opinion seems to be sound.
CONTRACTS-PROMISE TO PAY ANTECEDENT DEBT OF ANOTHER-CONSIDERATION-
LOAN.-The defendant held claims against B amounting to some $1,400. The
mother of B obtained a loan of $2oo from the defendant by giving one year
notes and mortgages on her real estate to secure the claims against her son
as well as the loan to her. The guardian of her estate, appointed after the
transaction, brought this action to set aside the notes and mortgages. Held(two judges dissenting), that the notes and mortgages were without considera-
tion and void except as to the amount of the loan, and that relief should begranted to that extent. Luing v. Petersen (i919, Minn.) 172 N. W. 692.
A promise to perform the pre-existing duties of her son ivould be unen-
forceable against the mother without some new consideration other than love
and affection. Rann v. Hughes (1778, H. L.) 7 T. R. 350, note (a); Schnell
v. Nell (I86i) 17 Ind. 29. The duty which the mother undertook in signing
the notes, however, was conditional and was not to come into existence unless
her son defaulted, except as to the $200. It is not, therefore, a question of the
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exchange of unequal sums of money not compensated for by the time ele-
ment, nor of imposition or undue influence on the mother. Cf. Shepard v.
Rhodes (1863) 7 R. I. 47o. The question squarely raised is whether a loan
can be consideration for more than a promise to repay it. It has been held
that a loan is consideration not only for a promissory note, but for a promise
to pay reasonable attorneys' fees for collection in case it is defaulted. Barton
v. Farmer National Bank (1887) 122 Ill. 352, 13 N. E. 503; Fowler v. Trust
Co. (1891) 141 U. S. 411, 12 Sup. Ct. i. And it has been held that a loan is
consideration for an agreement that one of two mortgages executed at the
same time should have a prior lien. Loewen, v. Forsee (1897) 137 Mo. 29, 38
S. W. 712. The value in the instant case of such a surety's promise as the
mother made is a very uncertain quantity, depending on the son's credit, and
there seems no reason why $2oo cash should not be good consideration for it,
even if it were perhaps a bad gamble. Except in the exchange of things whose
value may be mathematically calculated, courts will not inquire into the adequacy
of consideration. Schnell v. Nell, supra. It seems very probable, therefore,
that other states will follow the minority opinion in the future.
CoapRATIoNs-MuNIci'AL CoPxoRATIoS-LABmlTy FOR TORT-UNLAWFUL
UsE oF STREEr.-The defendant city had granted permission to the Elks to
run an automobile race as part of their convention carnival. The race
scheduled under this license was later abandoned but a race was run on that
afternoon. One of the racing cars ran into a boy who was standing in a crowd
of spectators and killed him. In an action by his parents, the jury found the
city negligent "in allowing the race to be run and not providing police pro-
tection." Held, that these were public duties for the exercise of which the
city was not liable. Rose v. Gypsum City (1ip, Kan.) 179 Pac. 348.
It seems evident that while the race was being run, the road could not be
safely used for ordinary travel and the finding of the jury established the
fact that the city knew of this .obstruction. A municipality is under a duty
to keep its streets in a reasonably safe and convenient condition for ordinary
travel. This duty is considered, in most American jurisdictions, as a common-
law obligation; in the others, it is imposed by statute. Barnes v. District of
Columbia (1875) 91 U. S. 540; Detroit v. Blackeby (187o) 21 Mich. 84; Dillion,
Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 1911) sec. 16gi. The extent of this duty is
not limited to the repair of structural defects and so the city is liable for
failure to remove obstructions in the highway, even though placed there with-
out its fault. 15 Am. & Eng. Cyc. (2d ed. 19oo) 431. And it is no defence
to an action for breach of this duty that the obstruction was the result of the
negligent performance of a governmental function. Savannah v. Jones (igig,
Ga.) 99 S. E. 294, infra, p. i29. Where the city licenses the placing of the
obstruction, it is liable as a partner. Cohen v. New York (1889) 113 N. Y.
532, 21 N. E. 7oo. Where the obstruction licensed is a street exhibition or
carnival, the city has been held liable when the streets have thus been made
unsafe. Richmond v. Smith (19o3) ioi Va. 16I, 43 S. E. 345; Van Cleef v.
Chicago (19o9) 24o Ill. 318, 88 N. E. 815; Wheeler v. Ft. Dodge (19o6) 131
Iowa, 566, io8 N. W. 1057 (rope strung across the road, high above the street).
But where the obstruction consists of moving objects subject to human will
or direction, there is no liability for failure to prevent or remove. Robinson
v. Greenville (885) 42 Oh. St. 625 (riot) ; Faulkner v. Aurora (1882) 95 Ind.
i3o (coasting) ; Jones v. Williamsburg (19oo) 97 Va. 722, 34 S. E. 883 (riding
bicycle on street); McCarthy v. Munising (igo4) 136 Mich. 622, 99 N. W. 865
(horse-racing). This duty to keep the streets safe seems, therefore, limited
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to obstructions which are fixed and stationary, and does not apply to such as
require the exercise of the governmental power over the conduct of others.
Cf. Bartlett v. Hooksett (1868) 48 N. H. I8. But although mere failure to
prevent this latter class of obstruction is not a breach of this municipal duty,
yet encouraging dangerous conduct by express license does impose a liability.
Little v. Madison (188o) 49 Wis. 6o5, 6 N. W. 249; Johnson v. New York
(igo6) 186 N. Y. 139, 78 N. E. 715 (automobile race); but see Marth v.
Kingfisher (io8) 22 Okla. 6o2, 98 Pac. 436. It seems, however, that the con-
duct licensed must be a nuisance per se. Burford v. Grand Rapids (1884) 53
Mich. 98, 18 N. W. 57I. The municipal immunity in the principal case may
be explained on the ground that the jury found that the race run was not
the one scheduled and thus licensed.
Co,'oRTioNs-MUNcinAL CoR'oRATIoNs-TERm OF OFFicE-RESIGNATION.-
The respondent was elected to the office of recorder for the term of one year,
ending July iO, 1919. The statute creating that office provided that the incumbent
should not "be eligible to any other office in the city of Athens during the
term of his office as recorder." On August 7, 1918, he resigned to accept an
appointment by the Mayor on the Civil Service Commission. Quo warranto
proceedings were then instituted. Held, that the respondent was ineligible
to any other office for the whole year for which he was elected to office of
recorder. Rowe v. Tuck (1919, Ga.) 99 S. E. 303.
The phrase "his term of office" is ambiguous and when in connection with
constitutional limitations or statutory disabilities raises the question of legis-
lative intent. It may be used in connection with a disability whch is personal
to the incumbent. State ex rel. Bashford v. Frear (19o9) 138 Wis. 536, 12o N. W.
216. Or in connection with a disability attached to the office. Foreman v.
McEwen (igo4) 2o9 Ill. 567, 71 N. E. 35 (constitutional prohibition of change
of salary). Ordinarily a "term of office" is an entity, separate and distinct
from all other terms of the same office. Thurston v. Clark (1895) io7 Calif.
285, 4o Pac. 435. It means a fixed and definite period of time. Polk v. Galusha
(9o5) 74 Neb. 188, 1O4 N. W. 197; State ex inf. Major ex rel. Sikes v.
Williams (19o9) 222 Mo. 268, 121 S. W. 64. This fixed period of time cannot
be altered by resolution of appointment. Stadler v. Detroit (1865) 13 Mich.
346; State v. Brady (1885) 42 Oh. St. 504. It is not the same as "right of
incumbency," which may have come to an end although fthe term still exists.
Palmer v. Commonwealth (19o6) 122 Ky. 693, 92 S. W. 588. In such a case,
the one who succeeds to the right of incumbency merely completes the unex-
pired term. Baker v. Kirk (187o) 43 Ind. 517; Jameson v. Hudson (1886)
82 Va. 279. The disability in the principal case is one personal to the incumbent.
When a personal disability is imposed -by ouster, it has been held to extend
over the whole period of the term. State v. Rose (19o6) 74 Kan. 262, 86 Pac.
296. The court in holding that the respondent cannot diminish the period of
his disability, by voluntary resignation, seems to have arrived at a sound
conclusion.
CRIMINAL LAw-AssAULT WITH INTENT TO RAPE-SUBSEQUENT YIELDIMG.-
Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to rape. He took exceptions
to the refusal of the trial court 'to give instructions that the defendant could
not be found guilty of assault with intent to rape, if the prosecutrix yielded
after the assault, to 9exual intercourse with the defendant, because of desire
and not through fear or inability to resist further. Held, that the instruction
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was properly refused, since subsequent yielding and consent cannot relate back
and cover the preceding acts. Brown, C. J. dissenting. Gadsden v. State
(1919, Fla.) 82 So. 5o.
The principle laid down in the instant case is in line with the weight of
authority. People v. Marrs (igoo) 125 Mich. 376, 84 N. W. 284; State v.
Bagan (1889) 41 Minn. 285, 43 N. W. 5. There cannot be an assault with
intent to rape where the female consents at the time of the assault. See 33
Cyc. 1433, note 45. Nor where there was mere solicitation for sexual inter-
course, without any demonstration of strenuous force. State v. Sanders (1912)
92 S. C. 427, 75 S. E. 702; Easterling v. State (1919, Miss.) 82 So. 306. The
intent of the defendant to commit rape must be proved, and the female must
have offered resistance at the time of the assault, in order to procure con-
viction for assault with intent to rape. Hunter v. State (1892) 29 Fla. 486, 1O
So. 730. Voluntary abandonment of purpose may be shown and considered as
bearing on his intent. It is probable that the subsequent yielding of the female
would be admitted to prove the intent of the accused at the time of the assault,
although no case on this point was found.
EQUITY-JURISDICrIO-EXTRA-TEMTORiAL EFFECt OF DECREE.-The plaintiff
brought suit for divorce against the defendant in the State of Washington.
The court having jurisdiction of the cause and the parties, decreed: (i) dis-
solution of the marriage; (2) that the defendant convey to the plaintiff certain
real estate in Iowa. Immediately after the decree, the defendant left Wash-
ington and went to Iowa where he transferred the property in question to A
who took with notice. The plaintiff brought suit in Iowa upon the Washington
decree and prayed that the deed from the defendant to A be set aside and that
the defendant be required to convey to plaintiff. Personal service was had on
both defendants. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought.
Matson v. Matson (1919, Iowa) 173 N. W. 127.
The power of a "foreign" court to create by decree a personal obligation
concerning domestic land has been denied by courts of the situs of the land.
Bullock v. Bullock (1894, t. Err. & App.) 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Atl. 676; Fall v.
Fall (905) 75 Neb. 1O4, 120, 113 N. W. 175. Nor can such courts be compelled
to recognize the foreign decree. Fall v. Eastin (igog) 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3.
In support of this position two arguments are commonly advanced: (i) That
an equitable decree ordering the conveyance of land creates no obligation in
another jurisdiction and therefore will not support a suit. Bullock v. Bullock,
supra (per Magie, J.) 3 Beale, Cases on the Conflict of Laws (1902) 348;
Beale, Sumnmary of the Conflict of Laws (19o2) sec. 82; note (1912) 25 HARv.
L. REv. 653. A decree for the payment of money, however, is universally
recognized as creating a binding obligation. Post v. Neafle (1805, N. Y.)
3 Cai. 22; Pennington v. Gibson (1853, U. S.) 16 How. 65, 16 L. ed. 847;
Sistare v. Sistare (191o) 218 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. 682. It is difficult to see
how the decree for money can be satisfactorily distinguished from the decree
for conveyance in this respect. (2) That to admit the "foreign" decree
would violate the settled principle that real property is "exclusively subject
to the laws and jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which it is situated."
Davis v. Headley (1871) 22 N. J. Eq. 115; Fall v. Fall, supra. But a deed
executed in pursuance of the "foreign" decree is recognized at the situs of
the land and cannot be avoided on the ground of duress. Gilliland v. Inabnit
(x894) 92 Iowa, 46, 6o N. W. 211. So this argument is robbed of its force.
The principal case takes the sounder view and finds ample support in authority.
Dunlap v. Byers (1896) i1O Mich. iog, 67 N. W. io67; McCune v. Goodwillie
(1907) 204 Mo. 306, 102 S. W. 997; Burnley v. Stevenson (1873) 24 Oh. St.
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474; Mallette v. Scheerer (1§16) 164 Wis. 16o N. W. x82. See Professor
Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree (1919) 17 MICH.
L. R v. 527.
EQurrY-JUaRISIcTION-POWER TO CREATE A Pimi AY RIGHT-SEPARATION
AGREEMENT.-A separation agreement provided for a fixed payment of $700 a
month to the wife, and that in case of "any material change in the circumstances
of either of the parties hereto either party hereto shall have the right to apply
to any court of competent jurisdiction for a modification" of the sum to be
paid. Later the wife became wealthy by reason of her ,stocks in companies
making war profits, and the husband's business as a New York real estate
lawyer was largely destroyed by war conditions. The husband brought a bill
in equity for specific enforcement of the contract, asking that -the sum to be
paid should be greatly reduced. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to
the relief asked. Stoddard v. Stoddard (1919, N. Y.) 124 N. E. 91.
It was the court's opinion that it had no jurisdiction to reduce the sum to
be paid and thus modify the contract; this not being a matrimonial action
to determine alimony. It is clear that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon
a court by mere consent or waiver or agreement of the parties. Eaton v.
Eaton (igig, Mass.) 124 N. E. 37. It is no doubt true, also, that in general a
court has no jurisdiction to create a primary right. The operative facts suffi-
cient to create the legal relation must exist before action. In the present case
the court believed that the contract created a primary right in the wife to
$70o a month, no more and no less, and that the clause providing for modifi-
cation was an attempt to confer upon a court jurisdiction to create a different
primary right. On this theory the legally operative fact creating a privilege
in the husband to pay less than $70o would be not the new circumstances of
the parties, but the decree of the court itself. It would seem not unreasonable,
however, to construe the contract to mean that the new circumstances shall
operate to reduce the wife's right to a "reasonable sum." If so construed, the
contract should be enforceable, just as contracts to pay a reasonable price
are enforced, the amount being left to the jury. See Joy v. St. Louis (1891)
138 U. S. I, 11 Sup. Ct. 243. This construction, however, seems to deprive
the plaintiff of any right to relief in equity; for he needs only to refuse to
pay more than the reasonable sum and has a good defence when sued for
more. Of course, there is uncertainty as to how much he should tender, and
it would be of advantage if he could get a declaratory judgment establishing
the exact extent of his duty and of the wife's right. See Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgment (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I, 105. In Kelso v.
Kelly (i86o, N. Y. C. P.) I Daly, 419, the parties had agreed on the renewal
of a lease with an arbitration to fix the rental, but the defendant refused to
appoint an arbitrator. The court decreed specific performance and itself fixed
the amount of the rental. This decree seems to create a primary right; for,
by the contract, the finding of an arbitrator was a condition precedent to an
enforceable duty to pay rent. It is possible, however, to distinguish the case
on the ground that the defendant had committed a 'breach of an existing
primary duty to appoint an arbitrator, and that the jurisdiction of the court
to compel payment of a reasonable sum fixed by the court was created by this
breach and not by agreement Like Kelso v. Kelly are Gregory v. Mighell
(1811, Eng. Ch.) 18 Ves. 328; Johnson v. Conger (i86i, N. Y. Gen. T.) 14
Abb. Pr. 195.
LABoR UNIONS-INJUNCTIONS AGAINST BoycoTTs.-The plaintiff refused to
accede to a request by the defendant union that he employ only union men in
his drayage business. Whereupon, the union ordered its members to have
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no dealings with the plaintiff and notified the business men in the community
that, unless they withdrew their custom from the plaintiff, they might expect
labor trouble with their own employees. The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin
these practices. Held, that the defendant union should be enjoined from
violating the plaintiff's "free liberty to contract." Auburn Draying Co. v.
Wardell (1919, N. Y.) 124 N. E. 97.
An individual is privileged to withdraw his patronage from anyone he wishes,
but he may not go farther and, by threats or intimidation, induce third parties
to cease their dealings. Peek v. Northern Pacific R. R. (915) 51 Mont. 295,
152 Pac. 421; Krigbaum v. Sbarbaro (1913) 23 Calif. App. 427, 138 Pac. 364.
He may not even carry out his purpose by setting up a rival business to
attract customers where his motive is to maliciously destroy a settled business
and not to engage in honest competition. Tuttle v. Buck (igog) iO7 Minn.
145, 119 N. W. 946; Boggs v. Duncan-Schell Furniture Co. (1913) 163 Iowa,
lo6, 143 N. W. 482. The same principles apply to a labor union's attempts to
boycott a hostile business. The members of a union are privileged to com-
bine in an agreement to cease dealing with the enemy. Wilson v. Hey (i9o8)
232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928; Mills v. U. S. Printing Co. (1904) 99 App. Div.
6o5, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185. Such action is known as the primary boycott and
the privilege to pursue it rests upon exactly the same grounds as the analogous
privilege to go on strike. Martin, The Modern Law of Labor Unions (igio) sec.
71. But when the union goes farther and attempts to induce outsiders to act
with them, they are in the field of the secondary boycott where privileges are
few. The use of force, threats, or intimidation is enjoinable. My Maryland
Lodge v. Adt (19o5) ioo Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721; Beck v. Railway Teamsters'
Union (1898) 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13. And the courts are quick to perceive
the possibility of force in any action. The publication of a business as
"unfair" has been construed as a threat and enjoined. American Federation of
Labor v. Buck's Stove and Range Co. (19o9, D. C.) 33 App. Cas. 83. But
where the action of the union is in the form of a mere request to the public
to withdraw patronage, no injunction will issue. Heitkamper v. Hoffman
(1917) 99 Misc. Rep. 543, 164 N. Y. Supp. 533; Pierce v. Stablemen.'s Union
(igog) 156 Calif. 7o, 1O3 Pac. 324. These cases emphasize the fact that there
must be the element of force in any true boycott, a fact which is often lost
sight of in the popular use of the word. Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle
(1908) 215 MO. 421, 114 S. W. 997.
LIENS-MECHANIcS LIENS-PAYMENT 3Y OwNERL-The defendant made pay-
ment to a contractor with instructions that the latter pay the plaintiff, the
material man, and discharge the lien which had accrued in favor of the
plaintiff for the material which went into defendant's house. The contractor
paid the plaintiff without giving instructions as to the application of the money;
the plaintiff applied it to a former debt of the contractor and then sought to
assert his lien against defendant's house. Held, that he could not. Parr v.
Weaver (1919, W. Va.) 99 S. E. 395.
It is well settled that when a debtor pays and does not specify to what debt
the payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply it to any of them. Jeffer-
son v. Church of St. Matthew (1889) 41 Minn. 392, 43 N. W. 74; Thacker v.
Bullock Lumber Co. (igio) 14o Ky. 463, 131 S. W. 271. So it has been held,
in opposition to the instant case, that where the material man does not know
the source of the payment, he does not have to apply it to the cancelling of
his lien against the owner who advanced the money. Thacker v. Bullock,
supra. But there is authority for the converse; that although the material man
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does .not know the source he must apply the payment to -the credit of the
owner paying it. This imposes a duty upon him to ascertain from whence it
came. Sioux City Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Merton (1916) 174 Iowa, 332,
156 N. W. 367. On the other hand, there are cases which hold that although
he knows the source he is not under a duty to apply it to the account of the
owner who pays it. Pipkorn Co. v. Evangelical Lutheran St. Jacobi Society
(9W1) 144 Wis. 501, 129 N. W. 516. And the converse of this last is held;
that if he knows the source he must apply it to the credit of the owner paying.
Hughes v. Flint (1911) 61 Wash. 46o, 112 Pac. 633. The debtor may specify
to what debt the payment shall be applied and his direction is controlling.
Brink v. Walter (19I1) 145 Ky. 17, 139 S. W. IO64. But if he does not the
law presumes, prima fade, that it was applied to the oldest one. Shepard v.
Steele (187o) 43 N. Y. 52, 6o. And it has been held that if the contractor
makes a payment on general account without directing application it must be
applied to the oldest item. Dey v. Anderson (1877) 39 N. J. L. i99, 20o5.
There is authority for the proposition that if the owner wants the money paid
on his account he must give seasonable notice to the material man -to apply it
in such manner. Jefferson v. Church of St. Matth-ew, supra. The principal
case seems to have taken the best position among the different possibilities;
that if the material man knows for which debt the money was given, he must
apply it to the payment of the same; that if he does not know, in the absence
of instructions, he can make such application as he wishes. This view puts
the burden on the owner to see that the desired credit is given for his money
and gives him a right against the material man that he shall so use it when
the purpose for which it was given is communicated to him.
MORTGAGES-FORECLOSURE SALE-REDEmproN .-The plaintiff purchased the
defendant's property at a foreclosure sale and wthen paid the back taxes on
the same. Later the defendant redeemed this property under a state statute
by payment of the sale price and interest. Another state statute permitted any-
one having a lien on property to pay the taxes thereon and add this amount
to his lien. The plaintiff sued to establish a lien for the amount he paid for
the back taxes. Held, that the lien would not be granted. Moore and Kulen,
J. J. dissenting. Wood v. Button (1919, Mich.) 172 N. W. 422.
The instant case by the strict construction of the statute and the refusal
of a lien to the plaintiff, is in accord with some authority and much dicta, but
equitable principles seem to call for an opposite conclusion. Government
Building & Loan Inst. v. Richards (1903) 32 Ind. App. 24, 68 N. E. 1O39; see
Walton v. Hollywood (1882) 47 Mich. 385, I1 N. W. 209; contra, Northern
Inv. Co. v. Frey Real Estate and Investment Co. (19o) 33 Colo. 480, 81 Pac.
3oo. The position of the purchaser during the redemption period appears
analogous to that of a mortgagee who may, in equity, add to the mortgage debt
taxes paid prior to the foreclosure sale. Jones, Mortgages (7th ed. 1915) sec.
io8o. Like the mortgagee, the purchaser's title is conditional; and, as in the
case of the mortgagor, the redeemer ought, in equity, to be compelled to refund
the taxes paid by the purchaser. The same reason which prompted the courts
to create an equitable lien in favor of the mortgagee exists here; that pay-
ment of taxes is essential for the protection of the security and eventually
inures to the benefit of the mortgagor or redeemer. To deny such a lien
would not only undeservedly enrich the redeemer, but tend to destroy the
market value -of such property at foreclosure sales. And so it has been
generally held that one who has paid taxes to protect his rights may be
subrogated to the tax lien of the state. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Haven
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(igo9) 196 N. Y. 487, 89 N. E. lo82. Cf. Sucker v. Cranmer (1914) 127 Minn.
124, 149 N. W. 16. It has also been held that one who in good faith paid taxes
on property with the intention of protecting his lien is entitled to be subrogated
to the lien of the state, although the lien supposed to exist and for 'the protec-
tion of which the person paid the taxes did not in fact exist. Spokane v.
Security Say. Soc. (igo7) 46 Wash. 15o, 89 Pac. 466; Kemp v. Cossart (1885)
47 Ark. 62, 14 S. W. 46. Therefore, it is submitted that the plaintiff should
have been granted an equitable lien. Also, it seems well settled that most
modern courts would have allowed a' quasi-contractual remedy, if proper
pleadings were drawn. Hogg v. Longstreet (1881) 97 Pa. St. 255; Woodward,
Quasi-Contracts (1913) sec. 248.
MORTGAGES-USURY-STATUTORY DEPENcE.-A state statute made all contracts
for the payment of loans with usurious interest unenforcible as to the interest.
The plaintiff executed a mortgage to the defendant as security for a loan
at a usurious rate of interest. After the plaintiff had paid more than the
amount of the principal as interest, the defendant foreclosed under power of
sale and purchased the land himself. The plaintiff immediately brought a bill
for the cancellation of the mortgage and the foreclosure deed. Held (two
judges dissenting), that this bill could not be maintained. Jones v. Meriwether
(1919, Ala.) 82 So. 185.
Under statutes making contracts for the payment of loans at a usurious
rate of interest void, a judgment of foreclosure is valid, even though the debt
for which it was rendered was void on account of usury. Bell v. Fergus
1892) 55 Ark. 536, 18 S. W. 931; Wilkson, v. Holton (19o4) 119 Ga. 557,
46 S. E. 620. A mortgagor can not avail himself of usury after a sale under
power to a bona fide purchaser. Ferguson v. Doden, (1892) I1 Mo. 208, 19
S. W. 727. But since the mortgagor has had no day in court, if the mortgagee,
or a person with notice of the usury, becomes a purchaser at such a sale, it
can be set aside. Jackson v. Dominick (1817, N. Y.) 14 Johns. 435; Jordan
v. Humphrey (1884) 31 Minn. 495, 18 N. W. 45o. If the plaintiff in the prin-
cipal case had brought this action before the foreclosure he could have had
the amount, which he had paid as interest, applied to the principal. Barclift
v. Fields (19o6) 145 Ala. 264, 41 So. 84. A sale under foreclosure in
compliance with a power after the debt secured has been paid, may be vacated
at any time before the statute of limitations has run, when the mortgagee
is the purchaser. Askew v. Sanders (1887) 84 Ala. 356, 4 So. I67; Liddell v.
Carson (1899) 122 Ala. 518, 26 So. 133. The principal case turned on the
interpretation of the local statute. The majority of the court held that it
required affirmative action on the part of the debtor before foreclosure under
a power, in order to avail himself of the benefit of this statute. The minority
contended that the debt was reduced pro tanto as the payments of usurious
interest were made. It would seem that the view of the minority is more in
accord with the spirit of the courts and the purpose of the statute.
SALEs-REScissiON-MUTuAL MISTAKE OF FAcT.-The plaintiff purchased ten
shares of bank stock from the defendant. The price was set according to the
value shown by the books of the bank. These books later proved to be false,
though neither party knew of this at the time of the sale. Held, that an
innocent, mutual mistake respecting value did not empower 'the plaintiff to
rescind. Hallam, J. dissenting. Castello v. Sykes (1g9g, Minn.) 172 N. W. 907.
The decision of the court seems clearly correct. Rescission will not be granted
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in every case of a mutual mistake. See Black, Rescission and Cancellation
(igi6) sec. 134. Where there is a conscious assumption of risk, the courts
will give no relief. Wood v. Boynton (1885) 64 Wis. 265, 25 N. W. 42. In
the instant case, the parties relied upon the accuracy of the books of the bank
in computing the value of the stock. Each knew of the possibility of falsifica-
tion; each gambled on it. -And a disappointed buyer or seller cannot be
allowed to upset contracts because the value of any other collateral attribute
of the stock resulted differently than expected. Sankey v. First Nat. Bank
(1875) 78 Pa. St. 48. See Cavanaugh v. Tyson (917) 227 Mass. 437, iI6 N. E.
818, 82o. The power to rescind in the case of a mutual mistake does not exist
unless the physical object or legal relations actually received is different in
substance from that bargained for. So the sale of a note will not be dissolved
merely because the maker proved to be insolvent. Hecht v. Batcheller (1888)
147 Mass. 335, 17 N. E. 651. In the instant case, as in the above note case,
the plaintiff received exactly what he intended to buy; a right or claim against
the bank. In order to nullify a transaction, the difference in the properties
of the object or in the jural relations which are the subject of the sale must
be so substantial as would have affected the very basis or understanding on
which the parties contracted. Sherwood v. Walker (1887) 66 Mich. 568, 33
N. W. gig. Yet what is a substantial difference is a matter of degree with
much room for variance. Therefore, it is submitted, that the result must
depend upon the usages and ideas of the business community; that it must
be determined in each case, for what the money was paid, and what risks each
party assumed, not simply whether the value or other such subsidiary quality
has proved otherwise than expected.
TAXATION-INHERTANcE TAXES-FEDERAL ESTATE TAx-NoT CHAiRGEABLE TO
GENERAL LEGATE.-A will gave legacies of $25,oo each to testatrix's three
cousins and left the residue to trustees for other beneficiaries. The executors,
having paid a federal estate tax of over $50,000, which was about four per cent.
of the whole net estate, deducted on account of such tax the same per cent.
from each legacy. Held, that the federal estate tax was payable out of the
estate and was not chargeable against the legatees. In re Hamin (1919, N. Y.
Ct. App.) 124 N. E. 4.
There would seem to be little room for debate as to the character of the tax
upon the decedent's estate imposed by the Internal Revenue Law (Sept. 8, igi6)
ch. 463, sec. 2O. It is a tax upon the passing of the estate as a whole, not
upon the transfer of the shares of the several beneficiaries. As pointed out
in the principal case, the reports of the Congressional Committee in charge of
the legislation as well as the language of the Act itself make this perfectly
clear. And -such has been the interpretation of the Act by other courts. See
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1055; 28 ibid. 194, 517. But the executors argued
that certain sections of the Act required, by implication, that the tax be
equitably apportioned among all persons benefiting from the transfer of the
estate. So the Surrogate court had ruled. Accord, In re Douglass' Estate
(igi8, Surr.) 171 N. Y. Supp. 956. The opposite view, which is now adopted by
the Court of Appeals, is believed to be the correct interpretation of the Act.
Under the English statutes "estate duty" upon property which passed to the ex-
ecutor at the time that the duty was imposed is similarly payable out of the resi-
due. See 13 Halisbury, Laws of England (igio) 219; Re Pullen figo] I Ch. 564.
But real estate and other property not passing to the executor bears its rateable
portion of the estate duty. 13 Halisbury, op. Cit. 220; in re Sharman [19O1]
2 Ch. 280. The alleged injustice of the principal case in placing the burden of
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the entire tax upon the residuary legatee is no greater than when the residue is
reduced by other expenses of administration. Besides the testator may, if he
chooses, direct how the tax may be charged. See Internal Revenue Law (1918)
sec. 4o8.
ToRTs-CoNvERSIoN-SUIT AGAINST UNITED STATEs--TucKER Act.-Pursuant
to a provision in a contract for public works with the principal contractor, the
United States took over property of the plaintiff, a subcontractor, crediting its
value to the principal contractor, and renting it to the defendant. The plaintiff
sued for c6nversion. Held,.that the defendant was liable because the taking by
the United States was tortious. Ball Engineering Co. v. White & Co. (1gIg)
39 Sup. Ct. 393.
The Tucker Act permits suit against the United States upon claims arising
from contracts, express or implied. 24 St. at L. 505, ch. 359. Claims sounding
in tort are not suable. Bigby v. United States (i9o3) 188 U. S. 400, 23 Sup\Ct.
468. In the instant case, however, the suit was brought againsi the contractor
to whom the United States delivered the property. This property was taken
without the consent of the plaintiff and without any contract between the
plaintiff and the government, either express or implied. Hence, the taking of
the property by the United States was tortious even though it was considered
the property of the principal contractor and its value credited to him. Cf. Schil-
linger v. United States (1894) 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct. 85. Also the act of
the defendant in receiving -the property was tortious. See 38 Cyc. 2o54, note 32.
Had the United States considered the property to 'be plaintiff's, it could have
been taken by eminent domain. Brooks v. United States (1904) 39 Ct. Cl. 494.
But no such procedure having been employed, this taking in the instant case was
a conversion. The United States was unjustly enriched by this tort, and if it
were an individual, it could be sued by the plaintiff in assumpsit for the amount
of the unjust enrichment. Rittenhouse v. Knoop (1894) 9 Ind. App. 126, 36
N. E. 384; Kleinboke v. Hoffnn House (i9o6, N. Y.) 5o Misc. Rep. 127, 97
N. Y. Supp. 1122. The suit would be in quasi-contract, often called implied
contract, although the facts show that no assent whatever was involved in the
transaction. But it seems that the Tucker Act does not permit suit against
the United States in quasi-contract as a remedy for the tort. The decisions
under this Act are based on the construction that only contracts implied in fact,
where the United States has signified its willingness and intention to pay the
owner, are within the purview of the Act. United States v. Berdan Fire Arms
Co. (1894) 156 U. S. 552, 15 Sup. Ct. 42o; Hill v. United States (1893) 149
U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. ioi. Decisions under previous Acts, almost identical
with the Tucker Act, are in accord. Hollister v. Benedict & B. Burnhan Mfg.
Co. (1885) 113 U. S. 59, 5 Sup. Ct. 717. There seems to be little authority
that the owner may disregard the tort and proceed against the United States
in quasi-contract. See Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General (1887) 124
U. S. 581, 598, 8 Sup. Ct. 631, 637. However, it would seem that where the
owner waives the tort and sues in assumpsit that the claim is not one sounding
in tort.
UNFAR ComPETrro-FALsE ADVERTISING--FEDERAL TanAD CommISIoN.-
The Federal Trade Commission found 'that the petitioner who was engaged in
interstate commerce had been guilty of unfair competition in selling and
advertising for sale sugars, teas, and coffees under representations that it had
obtained spedial price concessions because of its large purchasing power and
quick moving market. The petitioner was ordered by the commission to stop
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these unfair methods of competition, particularly in regard to false advertising.
The petitioner was also ordered to stop selling sugar at less than cost. The
petitioner brought this bill in equity and prayed that the commission's injunc-
tion be declared vacated, because the petitioner had ceased these practices twoyears before, and because the act which created the Federal Trade Commission
was unconstitutional and void; but if valid, it had not been infringed by these
practices. Held, that the injunction should be modified to allow the petitioner
to sell sugar at any price. Abschuler, J. dissenting. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission (1gig, C. C. A. 7th) 258 Fed. 3o7.
It seems that the Act creating the Federal Trade Commission would bedeclared constitutional and valid, because grants of similar authority to indi-
viduals and bodies have been so held. Union Bridge Co. v. United States (19o6)
204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. International Coal
Co. (1912) 230 U. S. 184, 33 Sup. Ct. 893; National Pole Co. v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co. (1914, C. C. A. 7th) 211 Fed. 65. The petitioner's practices
were clearly against public policy, and therefore infringements of this Act.In early law, there was no such remedy; and advertisements which injured
one's business, but not one personally, were not actionable either at law orin equity. Nonpareil Cork Mfg. C. v. Keasbey & Mathison Co. (igol, C. C.E. D. Pa.) io8 Fed. 721; White v. Mellin (H. L.) [1895] A. C. 154. Evans v.
Harlow (1844, Q. B.) Ad. & E. 624. However, business morals finally made
themselves felt, and recovery was allowed against one who made false
and malicious disparagement of another's goods. Western Counties Manure
Co. v. Lawes Chemical Co. (1874) L. R. 9 Exch. 218. Injunctions againstfalse advertising were eventually issued. Thomas v. Williams (1880) 14 Ch. D.
864; Liebig's Co. v. Anderson (1886) 55 L. T. Rep. N. S. 2o6. But goods
may be sold at any price one may elect, and the court should not inquire intohis motives. Oyello v. Worsley (1898) I Ch. 274; see Allen v. Flood (H. L.)[1898] A. C. I. Cessation of unfair practices prior to the date of the trial
is not an equitable ground for vacating an injunction, when at the time of the
trial, the petitioner was still alleging that the Federal Trade Commission Act
was unconstitutional and void, and that even if valid, there was no infringe-
ment by his acts. Goshen Mfg. Co. v. Myers Mfg. Co. (x916) 242 U. S. 2o2,
37 Sup. Ct. 105; Holmes v. Burnett (1913, N. D. Ill.) 2o6 Fed. 66. This deci-
sion seems to point out that advertising and free competition are being further
and further restrained. For an excellent discussion of the meaning of unfair
competition, see Montague, Unfair Methods of Competition (1916) 25 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 20; Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (1919) 29
ibid. I.
WILLS-CoNrTcT To DEVISE-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE.-The plaintiff
alleged that he had conveyed to his stepmother, then unmarried, 
-certain land
in consideration of her promise to devise this land to him on her death;
that she had made a holographic will devising such land to him, but had later
married the defendant, her administrator, who was appointed upon a petition
alleging that the stepmother died intestate. The plaintiff asked that the
defendant be decreed to hold the property in trust for him. Held, that although
under the California statute the subsequent marriage revoked the will, the
contract to devise was enforceable in equity, and the complaint stated a good
cause of action. Rundell v. McDonald (1919, Calif. App.) 182 Pac. 450.
Contracts to devise have generally been enforced in equity. Lawrence v.Prosser (1917, Ch.) 88 N. J. Eq. 43, ioI Atl. 1O4O; Steinberger v. Young (1917)
175 Calif. 81, 165 Pac. 432. But such relief has been refused where un-just results would follow. Sargent v. Corey (1917) 34 Calif. App. 193, 166 Pac.
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IO2I; Owenis v. McNally (i896) 113 Calif. 444, 45 Pac. 710. Some jurisdictions
hold a will made pursuant to such a contract irrevocable. Chase v. Stevens
(1917) 34 Calif. App. 98, i66 Pac. 1035; Baker v. Syfritt (igio) 147 Iowa, 49, 125
N. W. 998. But the better view is to hold the will ambulatory and admit the
later will to probate. Rasteller v. Hoenninger (1915) 214 N. Y. 66, io8 N. E.
2io; see (igg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 7O9. This is preferable because it
prevents the question of the validity of such contracts coming before the probate
courts. See Com-sa Ts (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 542. The principal case
is in accord with this authority in holding the contract enforceable notwith-
standing the revocation of the will by the marriage.
